Trump v. Slaughter · ¶57

The Court held that William Humphrey was one such official. That was because the FTC’s duties were very limited—they were “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” Id., at 624. When courts requested the FTC’s help as a “master in chancery” to recommend appropriate remedies in antitrust litigation, for instance, it acted solely as a judicial aid. Id., at 628. When Congress requested the FTC’s help to “mak[e] investigations and reports” on certain topics, it acted solely as a legislative aid. Ibid. And when it brought (and adjudicated) charges against corporations it suspected of using “unfair methods of competition” in commerce, it acted “in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.” Ibid. Because these quasi functions did not require the use of “executive power,” Justice Sutherland reasoned, Humphrey needed to answer only to…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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