Trump v. Slaughter · ¶62

Humphrey's has been difficult to make sense of from the start. “[O]nly by blind feats of definition” could the Court transform powers that are quintessentially executive—investigative and prosecutorial alike—into nonexecutive “quasilegislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions. P. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 625 (1984). As Justice Jackson memorably put it, Humphrey's “retreat to the qualifying `quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and `quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487–488 (1952) (dissenting opinion). When an agency “executes” a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power—no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.

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