Trump v. Slaughter · ¶63

At this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observation that an agency that “exercises no part of the executive power” need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal. 295 U. S., at 628; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 423–425, and n. 3 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Humphrey’s stands only for the proposition that there would be “no strict constitutional impediment to a ‘branchless’ agency” that exercises “no governmental power”). If Congress wishes to establish independent agencies to assist it with its functions, it may do so. Cf. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 137–138. But it may not foist those agencies upon the President, and thus deprive him of “the executive power vested [in him] by the Constitution”—something Humphrey’s itself never purported to permit. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at 628.

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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