Trump v. Slaughter · ¶67
For that reason, Humphrey’s is now far out of step with our cases, which have all but limited it to its facts. See su pra, at 18–20. We long ago retreated from Humphrey’s. We applied it only once, in 1958, to a solely adjudicatory body that dealt with a limited category of claims for compensation from those imprisoned or interned in the Second World War. Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 355–356. And even then, our constitutional analysis spanned only one brisk paragraph, as the case focused on the question whether the statute limited the President’s power at all. See id., at 356. Since then, we have undermined Humph rey’s premises at every turn. To persist in Humphrey’s would require us to depart from almost every case on the subject we have decided since.Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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