Trump v. Slaughter · ¶68
Little surprise, then, that no one knows how to apply Humphrey’s in practice. Does it protect all multimember agencies? See Wilcox v. Trump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215, 234 (DC 2025). Or only those that are balanced along partisan lines? See Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 151 F. 4th 761, 777–778 (CA5 2025). Those that wield some executive power, but not a lot? See Consumers’ Research v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 98 F. 4th 646, 652 (CA5 2024) (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Or only those that do not wield the President’s “conclusive and preclusive” powers? See Brief for Respondent 25–28. Or perhaps it is only those that are “materially indistinguishable from the 1935 FTC”? See Harris v. Bessent, 2025 WL 980278, *15 (CADC 2025) (Walker, J., concurring). With its indeterminacy and unpredictability, Humphrey’s “has undermined the very ‘rule of law’…Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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