Trump v. Slaughter · ¶80

Relatedly, we have left open the possibility that some functions traditionally handled outside the Executive Branch may not be encompassed by Myers’s general rule. Indeed, Myers itself placed “the greatest weight” on the early Congresses’ (and early Presidents’) “contemporaneous legislative exposition” of the Executive’s constitutional role. 272 U. S., at 174–175. And one example we have given of an entity that may have such a unique role is the Federal Reserve, to the extent that it follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States—both of which influenced monetary policy and neither of which were subject to plenary Presidential control. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8. Our prior cases do not necessarily implicate the constitutionality of such arrangements. Our opinion today should not be read to do so either.

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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