Trump v. Slaughter · ¶90

To bolster its reliance on modern practice, the dissent focuses on a modern case, Humphrey’s. But it defends a version of Humphrey’s that does not exist. On the dissent’s telling, Humphrey’s makes this a “profoundly easy case,” as Humphrey’s squarely holds that Congress may “forbid Presidential ‘removal’” “[f]or an agency of this ‘character.’” Post, at 2, 5 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 631); see also post, at 1–2, 5–12, 27–30, 34–46 (relying on Humph rey’s). Only halfway through a footnote does the dissent acknowledge that “Humphrey’s described the FTC [in 1935] as sharing ‘no part of the executive power,’” post, at 8, n. 1 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 628), which presumably forms part of an agency’s “character.” Nowhere does the dissent argue, however, that the FTC today exercises “no part of the executive power” or (to quote further from Humphrey’s) that the FTC occupies…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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