Trump v. Barbara · ¶268

Chief Justice Fuller’s dissent, joined by Justice Harlan, did not accept the Government’s primary theory that, to qualify for birthright citizenship, a child born in this country must also be born to citizen parents. Such a position, after all, was in tension with Justice Harlan’s twice-stated view that the Citizenship Clause turned on “complete jurisdiction,” Elk, 112 U. S., at 116–117 (dissenting opinion), or “resid[ence],” Plessy, 163 U. S., at 563 (dissenting opinion)—two terms that corresponded to domicile. Chief Justice Fuller’s dissent instead took the position that the Citizenship Clause “recognize[d] an essential difference between birth during temporary, and birth during permanent, residence.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S., at 729; accord, Comment, 7 Yale L. J. 365, 367 (1898). On his account, the Citizenship Clause excluded children “born of aliens whose residence was merely…

slip opinion, revised 7/01/26
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