Trump v. Barbara · ¶67

The principal dissent (but not the Government) at times seems to directly equate domicile and national citizenship. See post, at 9–10, 12–14, 40–41. That is wrong. “It is, in fact, a general axiom of international law, that there may be domicil where there is no nationality, and nationality where there is no domicil.” F. Wharton, Conflict of Laws §40a, p. 47 (1872); see also A. Cockburn, Nationality 204 (1869). After all, one who establishes a domicile in a new country does not automatically become a citizen thereof. (He has to be naturalized.) Nor does he automatically lose his prior citizenship. (He has to expatriate.) Thus, the principal dissent ultimately acknowledges that domicile alone was insufficient to make someone “formally” a “citizen.” Post, at 9.

slip opinion, revised 7/01/26
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