Trump v. Barbara · ¶74

When the principal dissent does grapple with the operative legal text—“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States—it has little to say. It argues only that a person is “subject to the jurisdiction of the government of his domicile.” Post, at 3. But that is not the question. The question is whether a person is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the government of the country in which he is physically present, even if he is only there temporarily. He is (unless he falls under one of the familiar exceptions, such as for ambassadors). For the reasons given by Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange, the United States exercises “full and complete power”—its “absolute and complete jurisdiction”—over temporary visitors. 7 Cranch 116, at 136.

slip opinion, revised 7/01/26
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