Blanche v. Lau · ¶72

The majority also maintains that the fact that §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) says “committed” (rather than “convicted,” for instance) means that the Government “may regard [an LPR] as seeking admission as soon as he ‘commit ted a’ crime involving moral turpitude ‘even if (as in [Lau’s] case) the conviction occurred’ later.” Ante, at 9 (quoting Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 222, 232 (2020)). Fair enough. I acknowledge that a conviction is not the only basis upon which a border officer could determine that an LPR has committed a qualifying crime. But that does not solve the majority’s sequencing problem. The border officer still must determine that an LPR “has committed” a crime involving moral turpitude. And that determination must be based on something—be it a confession, a credibility determination based on the border interview, a conviction, or otherwise. Moreover, as I have now said repeatedly,…

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