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Sripetch v. SEC · ¶18

When Mr. Sripetch appealed, however, the Ninth Circuit proceeded differently. Accepting the SEC's threshold argument, it held that “a finding of pecuniary harm is not required” before a court orders disgorgement. 154 F. 4th, at 985. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, under Liu, disgorgement “must be `awarded for victims.' ” 154 F. 4th, at 986 (quoting 591 U. S., at 75). But it rejected Mr. Sripetch's submission that “ `victim' ” must be “narrowly defined as an individual or entity that has suffered pecuniary harm.” 154 F. 4th, at 986. As support, the court pointed to common law sources indicating that “a claimant seeking disgorgement need only show `an actionable interference by the defendant with the claimant's legally protected interests.' ” Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51(1) (2010) (Third Restatement)). Given its conclusion that the SEC…
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