Sripetch v. SEC · ¶36

This argument may proceed from a sound premise but falters in its conclusion. Should the government seek to depart from traditional equitable principles and attempt to use § 78u(d)(7) to secure penalties, it would of course proceed beyond what Liu held § 78u(d)(5) tolerates. 591 U. S., at 82– 85. That development would raise questions about whether and to what degree § 78u(d)(7) permits deviation from equitable principles, and it would invite other questions too. See, e. g., SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 123–125 (2024) (holding that, when the SEC seeks penalties, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial). But none of this means, as Mr. Sripetch suggests, that we should hold the SEC's disgorgement remedy requires proof of pecuniary loss, a requirement foreign to Liu and to traditional equitable principles alike.

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