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Sripetch v. SEC · ¶37

Mr. Sripetch's amici offer one more way still in which, they say, a decision for the SEC in this case could risk transforming disgorgement into a penalty. They point to the traditional equitable principle that disgorgement is appropriate only in cases where a defendant has violated a victim's legally protected rights. See, e. g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 11– 12 (citing Third Restatement § 51, Comment a). And they express concern that the Commission might try to seek disgorgement even for securities-law violations that do not invade the legally protected interests of any investor. See id., at 15–20. But that worry, too, is beside the point in this case for, as it comes to us, Mr. Sripetch has not disputed that his victims “suffer[ed] a violation of their legally protected interests.” 154 F. 4th, at 986, n. 6.
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