Mullin v. Al Otro Lado · ¶119
The majority rightly does not dispute that its interpretation renders the “arrives in” clause superfuous. Ante, at 273–274 (conceding that the “arrives in” clause is a “subset of those who are `physically present in the United States' ”). Instead, it emphasizes that “[t]he anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule,” and cites several instances in which this Court has declined to apply it. Ante, at 272–273. It is true that there are circumstances where the anti-surplusage canon is less salient. For example, unlike here, the canon is less helpful when no alternative interpretation avoids surplusage. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P., 564 U. S. 91, 106 (2011) (declining to apply the canon because “no interpretation” of the statute “avoids excess language”); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012) (similar). Also, unlike here, the canon may be less relevant in a statutory…Read in context ›
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