Mullin v. Al Otro Lado · ¶140

Yet the majority’s construction allows immigration officers to circumvent this detailed statutory scheme by simply preventing noncitizens from stepping across the border. So long as officers turn noncitizens back, they need not inspect them, nor assess their eligibility for expedited removal, nor consider whether they indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, nor refer them to an asylum officer. Sections 1225(a) and 1158(a)(1) should not be construed to “open a loophole [that] allow[s] easy evasion of the statutory provision[s’] basic purpose.” County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U. S. 165, 180 (2020); see Whit man v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 485 (2001) (explaining that statutes should not be construed “in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit [the Government’s] discretion”).

slip opinion
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.