Clark v. Sweeney · ¶13

On remand, the Fourth Circuit should analyze the ineffective-assistance claim that Sweeney asserted. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, relief is barred unless the state court's decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). When assessing a Strickland claim that a state court has already adjudicated, the “analysis is `doubly deferential.' ” Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U. S. 731, 739 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 15 (2013)). “[A] federal court may grant relief only if every `fairminded jurist' would agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision.” 594 U. S., at 739–740 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 101 (2011)).

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