Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. · ¶36
The doctrine of judicial estoppel entered the mainstream in the federal courts only in the past few decades. See Brief for American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae 7–9. By all accounts, it was first recognized in an 1857 decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Hamilton v. Zimmer man, 37 Tenn. 39; see D. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel—Beating Shields Into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1711, 1719 (1991). A century later, judicial estoppel was still “the minority viewpoint which has encountered inhospitable reception outside the State of Tennessee.” Parkin son v. California Co., 233 F. 2d 432, 437–438 (CA10 1956). As late as 1980, the D. C. Circuit declined to apply judicial estoppel because it “ha[d] not been followed by anything approaching a majority of jurisdictions, nor [was] there a discernible modern trend in that direction.” Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F. 2d…Read in context ›
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