Allen v. Milligan · ¶38

The majority's order grapples with virtually none of this. Indeed, it does not even acknowledge that the District Court's discriminatory-intent finding is reviewed for clear error. Much of its reasoning rests on its assertion that, even as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, “the District Court's analysis departed from Callais.” Ante, at 514. That is wrong twice over. First, Callais “said not a word about the standard for Fourteenth Amendment intentional- discrimination claims.” Caster, 608 U. S., at ––– (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Instead, Callais was focused on changing the Court's law on “exactly what § 2 of the Voting Rights Act demands,” not what the Constitution demands. 608 U. S., at 109. Second, Callais said that its newly fashioned test for § 2 disparate-impact claims is not an intent- based test. It acknowledged that § 2 “does not demand a finding of intentional…

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