Trump v. Cook · ¶168

The Court offers many policy arguments for an “independent” Federal Reserve Board. Ante, at 5; accord, ante, at 23; ante, at 2 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring) (explaining that the “Federal Reserve’s independence” prevents “political upheaval” and “turmoil in the U. S. and world economies” and promotes the “efficacy of U. S. monetary policy”). As the Court tells it, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has for the past century served to provide the American people with “‘stable prices,’” “‘maximum employment,’” no “ruinous financial panics,” and a banking system free from “‘suspicion.’” Ante, at 3, 5, 14. The Court credits this century of supposed success to the Board’s “independence” from the President, and, in turn, the voters— the “‘common people’” who play the antagonist in the Court’s account of the 19th century. Ante, at 4.

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