Trump v. Cook · ¶54

That disposes, too, of the Government’s related argument that Congress “knows how to impose notice-and-hearing requirements”—that is, “expressly”—and did not do so here. Supp. Brief for Applicant 7–8; see also post, at 22–23, and n. 4 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (cataloging examples of such laws). Again, what is true for a statute with “specified causes” is true for this statute, too—in both instances, “notice and hearing are essential.” Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425; Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 314. And in any case, as we have said many times before, Congress not infrequently legislates in a “hyper-vigilant way, to remove any doubt as to things not particularly doubtful in the first instance.” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. 416, 435 (2018) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). That Congress acted “out of an abundance of caution” in other statutes…

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