Trump v. Cook · ¶60
JUSTICE BARRETT objects that we discuss this issue at all, even if only in response to JUSTICE THOMAS. See post, at 1– 2 (dissenting opinion); see also post, at 2–4 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (similarly contending that we should not issue a “comprehensive opinion at this juncture”). How much to say on our interim docket—and how much to say in response to a dissent—is not reducible to any mechanical formula; it is ultimately a matter of prudence, upon which reasonable minds can (and often do) disagree. See Mira belli v. Bonta, 607 U. S. 492, 501 (2026) (BARRETT, J., concurring) (“Interim applications routinely require the Court to balance the lock-in risk of saying too much against the transparency cost of saying too little”); compare Trump v. Illinois, 607 U. S. ＿＿＿ (2025), with id., at ＿＿＿ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6), and id., at ＿＿＿ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting)…Read in context ›
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