Mirabelli v. Bonta · ¶33
One last point: The Court has chosen to accompany today's order with a per curiam opinion that explains its reasoning. The choice to say more rather than less is perhaps the source of the dissent's concern that our disposition of this application will be taken as a “conclusive merits judgment.” Post, at 504. But see, e. g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (critiquing this Court's interim orders for “barely bother[ing] to explain [their] conclusion[s]”); Trump v. Boyle, 606 U. S. –––, ––– (2025) (Kagan, J., dissenting from grant of application for stay) (similar). Interim applications routinely require the Court to balance the lock-in risk of saying too much against the transparency cost of saying too little. See Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. 1110, 1128–1129 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring…Read in context ›
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