National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States · ¶13
Separately, the Trust points to Lujan’s statement that the “desire to . . . observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes,” can constitute “a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” 504 U. S., at 562–563; see also Sum mers, 555 U. S., at 494 (similar). And the Trust reasons that, if the desire to view a “particular crocodile” qualifies as a cognizable interest for purposes of Article III standing, Hoagland’s desire to view a new East Wing characterized by more “stately simplicity” than the government proposes must as well. See post, at 3 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Opposition to Application 25–26. But none of this helps the Trust either. Proceeding to reject the plaintiffs’ claim to standing, Lujan stressed that a cognizable interest is a necessary component of standing but not a sufficient one: Article III “requires more than an…Read in context ›
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