National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States · ¶14
Finally, the Trust replies that, even if this rule routinely applies in cases brought by ordinary citizens and taxpayers, it should not apply in this case. It should not, the Trust argues, because Hoagland is “not just any person,” post, at 6 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), but someone who possesses “focused and substantiated” expertise in historic architecture, post, at 3; see also Opposition to Application 26. Our standing rules, however, contain no such special carveout. Article III standing, we have consistently held, “is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest,” Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U. S., at 486, or by a litigant’s “special interest in the subject,” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972); brackets omitted).Read in context ›
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