National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States · ¶28

To serve as the basis for her standing, Hoagland’s aesthetic injury must be “concrete” and “particularized” to her—“real, and not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Separating the concrete and particularized from the abstract can be difficult in this context. Our precedents, however, have noted that an injury to a plaintiff ’s “mere esthetic interests” can qualify as “concrete and particularized.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 494 (2009). And we said in one of our leading standing precedents that it was “[o]f course” true that a “desire to . . . observe an animal species” like a particular crocodile, “even for purely esthetic purposes,” was “undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” Lujan v. De fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562–563 (1992).

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