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Terry v. Ohio · ¶44

If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could, on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I would have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable. Concealed weapons create an immediate and severe danger to the public, and though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks, it could well warrant action on less than a “probability.” I mention this line of analysis because I think it vital to point out that it cannot be applied in this case. On the record before us Ohio has not clothed its policemen with routine authority to frisk and disarm on suspicion; in the absence of state authority, policemen have no more right to “pat down” the outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom they address casual questions, than…
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U. S. Reports, bound volume
U. S. Reports, volume 392, at 1 (Library of Congress) · transcription: Caselaw Access Project
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