The Federalist Papers · Federalist No. 70 · alternate text · paragraph 23

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be “deep, solid, and ingenious,” that “the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE”; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to…

Publius · Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison · 1787–1788
Project Gutenberg #18, updated 11 October 2025; its author-attribution labels and source notes are retained. The supplied file does not identify one uniform underlying print edition.
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.