On Liberty · ¶132
In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common…Read in context ›
John Stuart Mill · Walter Scott Publishing edition, with W. L. Courtney’s introduction · Gutenberg #34901
John Stuart Mill · Walter Scott Publishing edition, with W. L. Courtney’s introduction · Gutenberg #34901
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