New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · ¶43

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guaran-teé the truth of all his factual assertions — and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount— leads to a comparable “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. See, e. g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1893); see also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875, 892 (1949). Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of…

U. S. Reports, bound volume
U. S. Reports, volume 376, at 254 (Library of Congress) · transcription: Caselaw Access Project
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